Статья из Economist об уходе Ф. Кастро (с русскими эквивалентами сложных фраз)

Castro's legacy – Наследие Кастро
HE HAS been the great survivor (переживший [остальных]) of world politics. When Fidel Castro marched into Havana in January 1959 at the head of his troop (во главе своего войска) of bearded revolutionaries (революционеров), Dwight Eisenhower, Harold Macmillan and Nikita Khrushchev were all in power (у власти), and the Beatles were yet to come (еще предстояло появиться). Ensconced (удобно устроившийся) in his Communist-run island, Castro has weathered (выдержал/перенес) ten American presidents and their economic embargo against him. He has outlasted (пережил) by almost two decades (почти на 2 десятилетия) the cold war and his former sponsor, the Soviet Union—long enough to benefit from (достаточно долго для того, чтобы извлечь выгоду из) a new era of anti-Americanism in which Hugo Chávez in oil-rich Venezuela has come to his aid (пришел ему на помощь). And now, at last, he is stepping down (уходит в отставку/покидает пост) as Cuba's president, for reasons of age and ill-health (по возрасту и нездоровью), but of his own volition (желаний) and with what he clearly hopes will be an orderly succession (упорядоченное/организованное престолонаследие) that preserves his revolution.
He will probably be replaced (возможно, ему на смену придет) by his brother, Raúl, who has been running (руководит) the government since Fidel underwent abdominal surgery (перенес полостную операцию) in July 2006. Raúl Castro has given many signals that he intends to restart reforms that in the mid-1990s introduced some market mechanisms into the sclerotic, centrally planned economy. Yet (однако/тем не менее) reform will at first be slow—not least (не в самую последнюю очередь) because while Fidel remains alive, he will have something of a veto over change.
Look a bit further ahead, and two broad scenarios seem possible in Cuba. The first is one in which the Communist Party oversees (здесь: станет свидетелем) the introduction of capitalism while retaining (одновременно сохранив) political control—in the mould of (по примеру) China, Vietnam or, closer to home, Mexico in the heyday of (в период расцвета) the Institutional Revolutionary Party. That seems to be the route favoured (именно этот путь кажется предпочтительным) by senior figures (высокопоставленные лица) in the regime, few of whom show any signs of being closet (тайными/скрытными) democrats. The other scenario is the one long dreamed of (тот , о котором долго мечтали) in Miami and in Washington, of the regime's sudden collapse (внезапном крахе).
The first prospect (предполагаемый план) stems from (обусловлен) the notion (взглядом/мнением) that Cuba is somehow different—its people won't want democracy. The second argues (утверждает) that the only exceptional (исключительным/необыкновенным) thing is Mr Castro: remove (уберите) his evil genius (злой гений) and the regime will crumble (погибнет/рухнет). In fact, the truth (истина) seems somewhere in between (где-то между). To get a sense of what might—and should—happen, start by cutting through the fog of propaganda surrounding Fidel himself.
The man and the myth
Apart from (помимо) its tropical ambience (дух/среда/общее настроение), Cuban Communism always differed from that of Eastern Europe in being the product of a national revolution (тем, что являлся продуктом национальной революции), not of foreign conquest (покорения иностранцами). Mr Castro was inspired (был вдохновлен) first and foremost (в первую очередь) by his country's frustrated (сорвавшимся/несостоявшимся) search for nationhood (государственности). As an island on the doorstep of the 20th century's superpower, Cuba's sad history was moulded (определялась) by geography. Insularity (изолированность) meant that Spanish colonial rule (колониальное господство) survived (продержалось) far longer (намного дольше) there; then came subjection (подчинение/порабощение) to the United States as a neo-colony.
Having won power (придя к власти), Mr Castro had no intention of giving it up (не имел ни малейшего желания от нее отказываться). It was not the American trade embargo that pushed him into the arms of the Soviet Union (и в объятия СССР его толкнуло отнюдь не торговое эмбарго); he went willingly (по собственному желанию). Yet the embargo, the CIA-organised invasion (организованное ЦРУ вторжение) at the Bay of Pigs and the agency's repeated assassination attempts (неоднократные покушения на убийство) against him all gave him the perfect—if false—justification (объяснение/оправдание) for dictatorship.
Mr Castro's supporters point out (отмечают) that he used his power to give Cubans world-class health and education services, at least until the Soviet subsidies dried up (как минимум до того времени, когда иссякли советские субсидии). Those achievements (достижения) were genuine (настоящими), but often exaggerated (преувеличенными). In 1959 Cuba was already one of the five leading countries in Latin America on a variety of (по ряду) socio-economic indicators (показателей). And along with (кроме) the schools and clinics came the dreary (грустные) economic failures (неудачи/промахи) of central planning, the absence (отсутствие) of political freedom and a police state. Cuba is outranked (Кубу обошли в рейтингах) today in the UN human-development index by democracies such as Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica, while Mexico is not far behind.
So forget the cigars and the posters: Cubans have had a rotten deal (отвратительную сделку) from a miserable (ничтожного) regime—and they know it. Scratch the surface (копните неглубоко) of the regime's propaganda, and profound discontent wells up (хлынет фонтан глубокого недовольства/неудовлетворения). But that does not mean they will automatically push out (вытолкнут/вытеснят) the Castros. Sadly, unlike much of (в отличие от многих частей) South America, the island has no democratic tradition to speak of. Two-thirds of Cubans have known no ruler (правителя) other than (кроме) Fidel. They may yearn for (жаждать) change but they also fear it: although (хотя) their lives are poor, they are also peaceful. If Fidel's successors (преемники) fix the economy, Cubans may acquiesce in (молча признать/согласиться на) their rule (правление).
That, however, is a big if. Raúl lacks (испытывает недостаток) his brother's charisma and it is not clear how he will deliver the “structural and conceptual changes” he admits the economy needs (которые, по его признанию, требуются экономике). Without reform, wages (заработная плата) and productivity will remain miserable (жалкими/мизерными); but reforms would bring more inequalities (неравенство) and resentments (обиду/негодование/возмущение) as well as benefits. That is why Raúl is proceeding with great caution (осторожностью).
Raise the embargo and help change through
The question now is a familiar one: whether to keep pressure on a dysfunctional dictatorship in the hope of dispatching (в надежде разделаться с) the Castros quickly, or to try to lure (завлечь/заманить) Raúl forward by dropping America's trade embargo. The first option has its logic: why let a repressive system modernise itself slowly? But there are more powerful reasons to drop the embargo now.
To begin with (во-первых), a policy that has failed to hurt (политика, которая не смогла причинить вреда) the Castros for four decades is unlikely to work (едва ли сработает) now. America risks leaving the field to Mr Chávez, who wants Venezuela to become more like Cuba rather than the other way around (а не наоборот). And what if pressure “worked”? The result at the moment could be chaos and violence (насилие). Cuba needs not just to dismantle (демонтировать) Fidel's Communism but to construct the state institutions (государственные институты) that might underpin (поддержать) capitalist democracy. The country can prosper (процветать) only if the two Cubas—the entrepreneurial (предпринимательская) diaspora of 1.5m Cuban-Americans and the 11m on the island—work together, rather than (а не) against each other. But that, too, will take time.